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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Judiciary may follow one of two distinguished paths in promoting 
social change in countries equipped with strong-form judicial review.1 
First, within the framework of traditional judicial review, the Judiciary 
may declare a law unconstitutional, establish a precedent, and expect 
compliance with it in subsequent cases.  This is usually accompanied by an 
award of damages, or some kind of individual redress.  
On the other hand, the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights 
as fundamental rights points to increasingly frequent cases in which the 
Judiciary abandons a passive stance.  In addition to enforcing a right, it finds 
it must assume an active political role, urging the public authorities to adopt 
a specific course of action or taking upon itself the management of a specific 
social conflict.  Where a violation of fundamental rights is due to the 
defective operation of a bureaucratic organization, such constitutional 
violation “cannot adequately be redressed through monetary compensation.”2  
Therefore, the “need to fulfill the court’s remedial duty justifies the use of 
structural injunctions to remedy public law violations”3 in which the aim is 
to “restructure public agencies”4 and to give “meaning to our constitutional 
values in the operation of these organizations.”5 
In the United States, the device used by the Judiciary to perform this 
managerial role has been the structural injunction, issued within the sphere of 
what is known as “Public Law Litigation.”  It is a device whereby the court 
not only strikes down a statute or a public policy as unconstitutional but also 
retains jurisdiction and seeks to enforce the judgment within the framework 
of a “polycentric”6 conflict.  Understanding that conflicts regarding groups or 
collective rights are ultimately decided in the day-to-day operation of these 
bureaucracies, the focus of court action is on the future remedy rather than 
on the enforcement of rights in individual cases.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (2008) (defining “strong-form 
judicial review” as a system in which judicial interpretations of the Constitution are final and 
unrevisable by ordinary legislative majorities). 
 2 Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1378 
(1991). 
 3 Id. at 1379. 
 4 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2004).  
 5 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). 
 6 See Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978) (defining “polycentric” conflicts as those with complex and 
interacting points of influence that can only be resolved by managerial direction or contract).  
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In recent years, several countries have regarded the American experience 
in this field as a path to follow.7  Thus, courts in countries like Argentina 
have adopted an activist approach relying on the prestige of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  However, the actual impact and results of judicially driven 
reforms are still under debate.  
These facts offer us the opportunity to contrast the experiences in both 
countries to answer a basic question: what are the conditions under which 
Public Law Litigation is effective?  
The aim of this Article is to answer that question using the comparative 
method.  We first seek to describe Public Law Litigation and the use of 
structural remedies in the United States and in Argentina, aligning 
similarities, linkages, and differences.  Then, the insight gathered will allow 
us to identify a set of generally valid principles and standards for the 
effective implementation of these complex procedural devices. 
To accomplish these goals, the analysis has been organized as follows:  
Part II reviews the experience of Public Law Litigation in the United 
States and examines some lessons to be learned from its case law.  
Part III argues that it is possible and useful to draw a comparison between 
the American and Argentine legal experiences, establishing the relevant 
contact points.  Then, it describes the cases in which the Supreme Court of 
Argentina has used structural remedies in the context of Public Law 
Litigation.   
Based on this comparative analysis, Part IV identifies and describes the 
political conditions and technical requirements needed to obtain effective 
results.  This schematic description makes up a model that may prove useful 
to assess and guide this controversial driver of social change. 
Finally, Part V states the general conclusions that may be drawn from this 
study.  
II.  PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Public Law Litigation and structural remedies were born in the United 
States within the framework of the civil rights cases of the mid-twentieth 
century.  This was the area in which “most courts gained their familiarity 
with public law litigation,” and these cases “shaped how federal courts 
would cope with public law litigation generally.”8 
                                                                                                                                                       
 7 See David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 
235–37 (2012). 
 8 Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 222 (2000). 
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Therefore, we will now focus on the most important milestones in the use 
of structural remedies in the field of racial desegregation of public schools, 
and will then make some specific comments concerning the area of prison 
reform.  Naturally, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of all of 
the cases relevant in this regard, so we will consider only those that are the 
most meaningful for the purpose of this Article.  
A.  Racial Desegregation in Schools 
Apart from some prior use in specific cases, the rise and definitive 
establishment of Public Law Litigation came with the racial desegregation 
process in public schools following Brown v. Board of Education9 and its 
progeny.  This case is no doubt paradigmatic and a key to understanding the 
subsequent development of structural remedies in different areas of the law.10  
This holds true not only for the United States but also for many other 
countries, including Argentina, as Brown came to exemplify globally “the 
possibility that lawyers could structure and execute a litigation strategy 
designed to produce substantial changes in the law.”11 
Still, while Brown is one of the most celebrated cases for its profound 
moral significance, the specific procedural measures adopted to implement 
such strategy, and the use of structural remedies by the courts over the years, 
have also met with heavy criticism. 
As is well-known, this famous decision of the Supreme Court came in the 
wake of a long judicial strategy pursued by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which adopted this course of 
action on numerous fronts of interest to the African-American population.  
The Supreme Court’s holding that de jure segregation violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment extended to all public educational institutions.  It 
affected the legislation of twenty-one states that required or expressly 
permitted a segregated educational system at the state level under the 
“separate-but-equal” doctrine.12  This doctrine was expressly repealed in 
Brown, in which it was concluded that “separate educational facilities are 
                                                                                                                                                       
 9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10 See Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 23 (1992).  Accord Appel, supra note 8, at 222; Fiss, supra note 5, at 2; Myriam E. Gilles, 
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1390 (2000). 
 11 Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 
1693 (2004). 
 12 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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inherently unequal.”13  The ruling was a typical declaration of 
unconstitutionality, with immediate legal effects.  
But, as the decision did not explicitly include any kind of “remedy” or 
practical consequence, the ruling was anything but complied with, and the 
Supreme Court had to issue a new decision to define how to carry out the 
enforcement duties.  
It took one more year to address the issue, and still nothing significant 
was decided.  In the case known as Brown II, the Supreme Court ruled that, 
in view of local peculiarities, the trial courts in each jurisdiction had to deal 
with this issue; such trial courts were to issue judgments urging public 
schools to admit students under a non-discrimination standard “with all 
deliberate speed.”14  In a way, the Supreme Court extricated itself from the 
problem of implementation and “delegated the reconstructive task to the 
lower federal judges.”15 
The stage beginning at this point was marked by the lone efforts of the 
lower courts, indifference from the other branches of the federal government, 
and stiff opposition by parts of the local governments in the southern states.  
From 1955 to 1964, the federal lower courts engaged in intense, wide-
ranging activity, while the Supreme Court issued at least three decisions in 
which it emphatically insisted on steering the course originally set.16  
However, in 1963, nine years after Brown I, resistance to change was still 
substantial; the results were not as expected, and at least two attempts to 
eschew the desegregation order needed to be halted by a ruling of 
unconstitutionality.  
Thus, in the period spanning from 1954 to 1964, the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts deployed considerable efforts to achieve racial 
desegregation in schools and the operation of a “unitary” system.  But theirs 
was a single-handed endeavor, unaided by the otherwise decisive support of 
the other branches of the federal government.  As Rosenberg notes, during 
this decade of intense judicial activity, “virtually nothing happened.”17 
The situation changed only in 1964.  Unlike the prior stage, this year saw 
a great deal of activity in Congress and the Executive.  As indicated by 
Rosenberg, it was only in 1964 that a Civil Rights Act was enacted that 
actually had a significant impact and entailed the decisive support of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 13 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
 14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 15 Fiss, supra note 5, at 3. 
 16 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 
(1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
 17 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008).  
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political branches of the federal government.18  The Attorney General was 
once again authorized to bring actions on behalf of affected individuals, and 
it became possible to deny federal funds to school districts engaged in racial 
discrimination.  In comparison with this initiative positively involving the 
political branches of government, the actions of the Judiciary “appear 
irrelevant.”19 
As far as the judicial sphere is concerned, from 1964 to 1968 the Supreme 
Court did not render any significant decisions.  But in 1968 its work gathered 
steam, and in Green v. Board of New Kent County it issued the first judgment 
in which the Supreme Court itself defined standards and factors to determine 
whether a desegregation plan was constitutionally acceptable.  Later, in 
1969, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Holmes County, in which it 
stated that the time to act under the “with all deliberate speed” standard had 
run out and schools must desegregate immediately.20 
With a Judiciary acting in full exercise of its authority, accompanied by 
decisive action on the part of the political branches of the federal government 
and with the support of a majority of public opinion, tangible results began to 
emerge.  Resistance waned, and local authorities gradually complied with 
judicial remedies.21 
At this point, an initial stage came to a close and another one started in 
which the courts were confronted with the much harder problem of 
segregation in urban areas.  In rural districts, which only had one or two 
schools, the issue was not particularly challenging.  By contrast, urban areas 
with hundreds of schools revealed that “although Brown succeeded in 
eliminating de jure segregation, it fell short of eliminating de facto 
segregation.”22 
Faced with this reality, the courts sought to use a different type of 
intervention and began to employ more ambitious remedies, such as 
“busing.”  This remedy consisted of a court-ordered, mandatory public 
transportation program aimed at ensuring racial integration in terms of 
proportional representation within a specific school district.  The program 
                                                                                                                                                       
 18 Id. at 49–54.   
 19 Id. at 52; accord Michael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equality, in AMERICAN 
HISTORY 213–19 (2007); Martin R. West & Joshua M. Dunn, The Supreme Court as School 
Board Revisited, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN 
AMERICAN EDUCATION 3, 7 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009). 
 20 Green v. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes Cnty., 396 
U.S. 19 (1969). 
 21 See ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 52–53.  
 22 Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2421 
(2004). 
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included the transportation of children to places somewhat distant from their 
homes in order to reverse the underlying trend that a particular ethnic group 
prevailed in certain neighborhoods.  This new approach was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Green23 and Swann.24 
It is clear that the courts went from a minimalist and incremental 
approach to a maximalist approach geared toward resolving not only the 
immediate constitutional controversy but also an underlying social conflict.  
In the case of racial segregation, the courts were not content with banning de 
jure discrimination; rather, they also sought to shift demographic patterns, 
internal migrations, school budgets, relative income, etc.  The court system 
thus firmly focused on coping with a conflict that was polycentric in nature 
by using a set of far-reaching structural remedies that were designed as rights 
by the Judiciary and, as a result, not afforded much flexibility.  
This approach met with resistance, social protest, and the reaction of 
certain communities that felt invaded by federal policy.25  In this specific 
case, a process began to develop that sociologist James S. Coleman has 
defined as “white flight,”26 defined as the large-scale migration to school 
districts that were not affected by the busing policy or going over to the 
private school system.  Given the underlying conditions that were the 
product of different income patterns, the intervention of the courts 
paradoxically created an unwanted incentive to the development of an 
educational system for the rich.  It has been argued in this regard that busing 
was a decisive factor in demographic and migration trends.27 
In an effort to address the white flight problem, some courts responded by 
adopting a more expansive stance: they extended the mandatory 
transportation order to neighboring districts, thus forcing children to travel 
increasingly longer distances from their homes.  But in deciding Milliken,28 
the Supreme Court ruled that the busing policy was not to apply to children 
in communities with no record of de jure racial segregation.  
Therefore, the scant flexibility of the scheme, supported by unilateral 
judicial decisions endowed with the aura of enforcing constitutional rights, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 23 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 24 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 25 See LUCAS A. POWE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008, at 268–
70 (2009); Susan Olzak et al., School Desegregation, Interracial Exposure, and Antibusing 
Activity in Contemporary Urban America, 100 AM. J. SOC. 196, 232 (1994).  
 26 See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968–73 
(1975). 
 27 See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 170–76 
(1996). 
 28 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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led in many places to an exodus from public schools, as well as to their 
gradual impoverishment, stigmatization and more acute racial segregation 
than before the implementation of the remedies.  
Finally, in 1991, the Supreme Court helmed by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
decided in Dowell29 that schools could not remain indefinitely under judicial 
supervision and that it was time to return control to the local authorities in 
order for them to find suitable and flexible policies to accommodate each 
need.  By then, there were more than 800 school districts under judicial 
supervision.  Additionally, in deciding Freeman v. Pitts in 1992, the 
Supreme Court put an end to judicial maximalism, holding that private 
actions cannot be judged under constitutional standards and that it was 
“beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these 
kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts.”30  Within this context, 
there are studies showing that racial resegregation has been a well-
entrenched trend since the early 1980s.31  On the strength of this evidence, 
several authors maintain that unilateral, top-down remedies like busing have 
failed.32 
What followed during the 1990s was a gradual decline in the use of 
structural remedies within the framework of racial desegregation in 
schools.33  The courts began to focus on how and when to terminate judicial 
intervention in public school management.34  Evidence revealed a picture 
that was “far from pretty, further complicating Brown’s legacy, and serving 
as yet another reminder of the limits of well-intentioned efforts to improve 
educational practice, policy, and results through litigation.”35  Hence the 
many voices that express criticism at the managerial role of the courts in the 
quest for educational reform. 
While there is no question about the efficacy of Brown in terminating de 
jure segregation, the subsequent judicial intervention had rights and wrongs, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 29 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 30 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 31 See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1997). 
 32 See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 27; CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING (1991); Daniel Kiel, 
Exploded Dream: Desegregation in the Memphis City Schools, 26 LAW & INEQ. 261 (2008). 
 33 Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161 
(1998); Dennis Schapiro, Looking for Justice in All the Wrong Places: Reflections on the End 
of the School Desegregation Era, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 323, 323 (1996). 
 34 Michael , Assessing the Efficacy of School Desegregation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1093, 
1096 (1996); Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, 
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759, 759 (1993). 
 35 Heise, supra note 22, at 2419. 
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leading to mixed results or to results that were paradoxically detrimental to 
those groups that the courts purported to benefit.  Most authors conclude 
today that “before Congress and the executive branch acted, courts had 
virtually no direct effect”36 and that “the courtroom is rarely the optimal 
venue for education policymaking.”37 
Furthermore, over the long term, social reaction to unilateral, mandatory, 
and hardly flexible judicial intervention has stoked resistance moves that 
have delayed ongoing integration processes.  In some cases, this even 
prompted the contention that “gradual resegregation, already in progress 
even in ‘successfully’ desegregated districts, will likely persist,” which is 
why “Brown’s legacy in this context is aptly characterized as one of 
unfulfilled promise.”38 
B.  Prison Reform 
Mark Tushnet explains that after “gaining experience in supervising 
important bureaucratic institutions in the school setting, the lower courts 
began extending their supervision to other institutions similarly regulated by 
the Constitution.”39  Thus, as soon as the issue of prison conditions raised 
some interest among public opinion, the Judiciary embarked on a reform of 
the system with the tools developed in the area of racial desegregation in 
schools.  
Two circumstances converged in the United States in the second half of 
the twentieth century that would be key to provoking a change in the role of 
the Judiciary in this field.  
On the one hand, from a sociological standpoint, there was an exponential 
increase in prison population beginning in the mid-twentieth century,40 which 
brought with it escalating problems of overcrowding, corruption, ill-
treatment, or violence in prisons.  The plight gained public visibility with the 
riots of the late 1950s, and thus found its place on the civil rights agenda that 
was then gathering momentum.  
On the other hand, on the strictly judicial front, the Warren Court began 
to identify inmates as one of the “discrete and insular minorities”41 deserving 
                                                                                                                                                       
 36 ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 70. 
 37 West & Dunn, supra note 19, at 4. 
 38 Heise, supra note 22, at 2419; see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE JR., ALL DELIBERATE 
SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2005) 
(arguing that Brown failed to effectively promote integration). 
 39 Tushnet, supra note 10, at 25. 
 40 Peter Finn, Judicial Responses to Prison Crowding, 67 JUDICATURE 318, 319 (1984). 
 41 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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the protection of the federal courts.  Additionally, the enforcement of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause led to the slow abandonment of the 
“hands-off” policy that prevented federal interference in state penal conflicts, 
first clearly stated in 1866 in Pervear v. Massachusetts.42  Driven by the 
judicial victories of the NAACP, and with the support of a radical change in 
public opinion and in that of political leaders at the federal level, the 
Judiciary began to adopt structural injunctions to reform the prison system.  
Change unfolded in stages.  In cases like Trop v. Dulles,43 the Supreme 
Court said that there were “evolving standards of decency” that necessarily 
influenced the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  Subsequently, in 
Robinson v. California,44 the Supreme Court extended this federal 
constitutional clause to the states, holding unconstitutional a California State 
law for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment.  In Jones v. Cunningham,45 the Supreme Court admitted 
that inmates subject to state jurisdiction had the right to file a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the conditions of their imprisonment as well as its legality 
under Federal Constitution standards.46  Finally, in Cooper v. Pate,47 it ruled 
that state prison inmates have standing to sue in federal court under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871.48 
From then on, there was a proliferation of class actions and collective 
lawsuits.  The “hands-off” judicial tenet was abolished forever.49  The federal 
courts were allowed to interfere and urged to attempt a full transformation of 
state prisons.50  It was within this legal framework that decisions provided 
for large-scale structural reforms.  
A myriad of cases should be cited if a complete historical review were to 
be attempted of the developments in this area of judicial intervention during 
the 1970s.  For the sake of brevity, only the most significant are discussed.  
Common to all of them is that they entailed massive intervention in the 
prison system and the establishment by the Judiciary of extensive plans, 
formulated down to the smallest detail, setting out guidelines for the 
management of prison facilities.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 42 72 U.S. 475 (1866).  
 43 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 44 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 45 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 
 46 Id. at 236–43. 
 47 378 U.S. 546 (1964). 
 48 GEORGE F. COLE ET AL., THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 534 (2014). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison 
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–64 (2006). 
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In the 1969 case, Holt v. Sarver,51 the Supreme Court declared several 
aspects of Arkansas’ prison system unconstitutional.  Injunctive relief was 
ordered in subsequent decisions including the obligation to establish 
guidelines to follow for correcting the problems; a court ordered 
administrators to report on the progress of the implementation of these 
guidelines and, later, directed the State Correction Board to devise a plan of 
action.52  From this point onwards, the courts began to weigh the “cumulative 
effect” of conditions of confinement by prisoners as a test for establishing a 
possible constitutional violation.53 
Along the same lines, mention should be made of the landmark ruling in 
Pugh v. Locke,54 a case deriving from a class action filed by Alabama prison 
inmates.  In an appendix to its decision, the District Court instituted the 
“Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of Alabama Penal System,” 
consisting of a detailed prison management plan to be supervised by a 
Human Rights Committee for the Alabama Prison System.55  As a result, the 
administrative authorities of the Alabama Board of Corrections became 
subject to the court’s supervision.56 
Last, particularly noteworthy is Ruiz v. Estelle,57 decided by a Texas 
federal court.  This case provides the most telling example of how far 
judicial intervention went in regulating conditions of prison incarceration.  
Again, an individual petition led to a class action alleging that overcrowding, 
lack of access to health care, and abusive security practices were a violation 
of the U.S. Constitution.58  The legacy was more than a decade of litigation 
in the form of consent decrees, appeals, and other legal actions, and despite a 
certain amount of progress, compliance problems recurred.59 
We now approach the last stage in this path charted by the courts—a 
phase marked by a state of virtual saturation, legislative reaction calculated 
to curb the expansion of judicial intervention, and, in the end, progressive 
disengagement.  The early 1990s showed that the courts were, for all 
practical purposes, in charge of managing prison facilities and that “virtually 
                                                                                                                                                       
 51 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969). 
 52 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 59–66 (2000). 
 53 L. Lee Boatright, Note, Federal Courts and State Prison Reform: A Formula for Large 
Scale Federal Intervention into State Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 545, 547 (1980).  
 54 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
 55 Id. at 332–37. 
 56 Id. at 331.  
 57 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
 58 Id. at 1275–76. 
 59 See BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED 
REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 226–38 (2010).  
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every facet of institutional life has been constitutionalized in ways that 
directly affect prisons and jails in all fifty states.”60 
As the system matured, orders were no longer issued unilaterally, top-
down from the courts.  Judicial intervention evolved into consent decrees 
drafted within multilateral negotiation processes involving administrative 
authorities and class action representatives.  In all cases, this meant that 
jurisdiction was retained over long periods, which was “frequently 
accompanied by an increase in supervision” and the use of “contempt 
citations”61 to enforce inflexible plans.  Moreover, the courts delegated their 
authority and relied especially on the support of special masters, who “are 
able to oversee the daily operation of prisons and administer the details of 
court orders after the case is decided.”62 
Over time, opinion of both the public and the federal government shifted.  
Both shifts pointed to the counterproductive effects of judicial intervention.  
The increased expense necessarily entailed by an improvement of conditions 
in prison facilities was to blame for the unavailability of funds necessary to 
build new prisons or improve other aspects of crime prevention policies.  
Also, public opinion began to turn its attention to the large number of 
frivolous claims.  The attendant clogging of the courts and administrative 
overload became apparent.  At the same time, a number of studies 
“suggested that judicial intervention resulted in increased violence in 
prison,”63 as a consequence of the “diminishing authority of correctional 
officers”64 and, in general, of the “climate of uncertainty and disruption of 
the prison administration autonomy,”65 all of which had an impact on the 
increase in the crime rate.66 
                                                                                                                                                       
 60 Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Handson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons 
and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 13 
(John J. Di lulio ed., 1990); accord STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 95 (2002).  
 61 BRADLEY S. CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF 
GEORGIA PRISONS 55 (1991). 
 62 POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 98.  
 63 Id. at 100. 
 64 Id.; see also LARRY E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT: FORLORN HOPE 92 
(1990); Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, Prison Violence and the Paradox of Reform, 73 
PUB. INT. 91, 91–105 (1983).  
 65 POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 101. 
 66 ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN 
COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 187 (2003). 
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Two courses of action aimed at reversing this situation are worthy of 
note.  First, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,67 the Supreme Court 
sought to set parameters allowing for consent decrees to be more flexible and 
easy to modify.  Within this context, it also held that “[f]inancial constraints 
may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional 
violations, but they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in 
institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in 
tailoring a consent decree modification.”68 
Second, a turn in public opinion and political support surfaced as 
Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)69 of 1996.  The 
goal was to decrease the incidence of litigation within the management of 
prison conditions.  Among other things, it provided that a court “shall not 
grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief 
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation 
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right.”70  “Automatic stay” and “exhaustion” 
mechanisms were also introduced as a way of limiting access to the courts.71 
These factors, added to an increasing conservatism of the federal bench.  
Doctrinal innovations of the mid-1990s restricting injunctive remedies and 
declining funding for inmates’ advocates72 account for the downward trend 
in this field.  
C.  Overall Assessment 
The cases involving issues of racial desegregation in schools and of 
prison reform are the examples of Public Law Litigation that have grabbed 
most of the attention.  Similar patterns, drawn along comparable lines, can be 
observed in environmental law cases and in the reform of mental health 
institutions.  Leaving aside certain ideological stances, today’s U.S. legal 
literature shows that structural injunctions have, at best, a limited impact73 
and may cause paradoxical or counterproductive effects.  
As far as desegregation in schools is concerned, evidence suggests that a 
model of unilateral judicial intervention providing for mandatory plans 
                                                                                                                                                       
 67 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
 68 Id. at 392. 
 69 Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996). 
 70 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000).  
 71 Id. 
 72 Schlanger, supra note 50, at 590. 
 73 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 340–42 
(1996); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 6. 
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sought to be applied against the active resistance of the political powers or 
large sections of public opinion is usually ineffective.  It might be argued 
that this kind of intervention can be justified on the grounds that it is 
instrumental in placing the issue on the public agenda, thus fostering debate 
and the development of solutions.74  While this political impact is impossible 
to measure, critical authors claim that its downside effects include the 
demobilization of interest groups,75 the misapplication of scarce financial and 
human resources,76 and the ensuing possibility that politicians will shy away 
from the underlying conflict, which thus becomes the sole responsibility of 
the courts.77 
This is why, even when it comes to bringing these conflicts onto the 
political arena, the overall assessment may also prove to be negative.  
Specifically, scholars have highlighted the delaying effect of the judicial 
strategy in the realm of racial integration78 apparently stemming from the 
fact that “the black community’s belief in the efficacy of litigation inhibited 
the development of techniques involving popular participation and 
control.”79 
                                                                                                                                                       
 74 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 19 (explaining the “agenda-setting” effect of Brown, 
although mentioning that opinion on race was educated far more by the civil rights movement 
than by litigation); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (arguing that sometimes litigation can be a catalyst 
for social movements). 
 75 Authors enrolled in the Critical Legal Studies movement consider that the litigation 
strategy is ineffective in achieving its objectives, counterproductive, and conservative in 
reinforcing structures of subordination.  See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM 
SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986); Lani Guinier, From 
Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights 
Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); Reva Siegel, 
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1132–45 (1997). 
 76 Klarman, supra note 19, at 219 (claiming that after Brown, litigation and direct action 
competed for scarce resources). 
 77 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 102; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 
139; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 173 (1999).  
 78 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 156; Kiel, supra note 32, at 261 (arguing that the 
use of structural remedies such as busing served as a “death knell” for effective integration); 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown, Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to Canonize a 
Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994).  But see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and 
the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (arguing that Brown indirectly accelerated 
the pace of racial change by crystallizing southern white resistance, which in turn led to 
violent confrontation and then national intervention in the form of civil rights legislation). 
 79 Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (1976). 
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A review of the results in the area of prison reform invites a similar 
conclusion.  Although it is perceived as one of the few areas in which the 
courts have been “relatively successful,”80 it is not clear that any such 
success was necessarily a product of judicial intervention.  Some studies 
indicate that most prison construction is not in response to lawsuits, and that 
after more than a decade of litigation, prison overcrowding continued to be a 
problem.81 
At the same time, similarly to desegregation in schools, unilateral and 
inflexible models led to resistance and counterproductive effects.  As noted 
above, judicial intervention proved ineffective in securing budgetary 
resources,82 and it led to diminished authority slackening in prisons83 and to 
increased violence among inmates,84 and in some cases, to a rise in the crime 
rate.85  As happened with the educational reform, public opinion has 
eventually turned its back on this kind of approach.86 
Still, all of the cases examined above have some positive points from 
which helpful conclusions may be drawn to formulate principles for a 
productive use of structural remedies.  
In general, present-day authors suggest that judicially-driven reforms are 
advisable only in those cases in which the legal and political system allows 
for the implementation of a “multilateral”87 or “experimentalist”88 model in 
which the court operates more as a “power broker”89 or “negotiator”90 than as 
                                                                                                                                                       
 80 Malcolm M. Feeley, Implementing Court Orders in the United States: Judges as 
Executives, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT 221, 223 (Marc Herthog & 
Simon Halliday eds., 2004); accord POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 108. 
 81 See Peter M. Koneazny & Karl D. Schwartz, Preface to The Colloquium: The Prison 
Overcrowding Crisis, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1984). 
 82 Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 735, 775 (1992).  
 83 POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 111. 
 84 See id. at 96; ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 307; James W. Marquart & Ben M. Crouch, 
Judicial Reform and Prisoner Control: The Impact of Ruiz v. Estelle on a Texas Penitentiary, 
19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 557, 575 (1985). 
 85 SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 187. 
 86 See Schlanger, supra note 50, at 571. 
 87 David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and 
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2004) (dividing commentators on 
institutional reform litigation into “unilateralists” who focus on judges and “multilateralists” 
who look at other participants as well). 
 88 Sabel & Simon, supra note 4, at 1016. 
 89 See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN 
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987); Colin S. Diver, The 
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 
VA. L. REV. 43, 77–88 (1979). 
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the fount of public policies.  This conception entails open rules of procedure, 
molding the litigation proceeding into a participatory setting—a forum in 
which the parties involved may be at liberty to agree on the steps to be taken 
to achieve reform.  The cornerstone of this approach is, therefore, the ability 
of the courts to promote the engagement of political authorities and class 
representatives, such that coordinated efforts may result in a sustainable 
impact in the long term.  
Beyond this multilateral model—inherently difficult to carry out in 
practice—the review of Public Law Litigation and the use of structural 
remedies in the United States lays bare that these types of devices have lost 
momentum, are past their climax, and, in most cases, fall short of 
expectations.  This explains why the overall picture today reveals that 
“ ‘structural injunctions’ have receded from the remedial scene.”91 
III.  PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN ARGENTINA 
A.  The Case of Argentina: Why it is Relevant 
For purposes of this comparative study, an analysis of the situation in 
Argentina has several interesting sides to it.  First, Argentina is one of the 
few countries in the region with both a vast catalog of social, economic, and 
cultural rights afforded constitutional rank and a model of strong-form 
judicial review92 almost identical to that in the United States. 
Moreover, “structural injunction-like devices have been rare in 
comparative constitutional law,”93 and within this context, Argentina appears 
as “one of the few countries that has actually attempted structural 
remedies.”94  This peculiarity can be accounted for by the recent adoption of 
a model of an activist Supreme Court, which seeks to gain legitimacy before 
                                                                                                                                                       
 90 See R. Shep Melnick, Taking Remedies Seriously: Can Courts Control Public Schools?, 
in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 
supra note 19, at 17, 29; accord Catherine Y. Kim, Procedures for Public Law Remediation in 
School-to-Prison Pipeline Litigation: Lessons Learned from Antoine v. Winner School 
District, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 955, 961–62 (2009/10); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero 
Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2012 (1999); 
Sturm, supra note 2, at 1438. 
 91 Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004); accord Myriam 
Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 143–44 (2003); Russell L. Weaver, The Rise and Decline of Structural 
Remedies, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1617 (2004). 
 92 See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 33.   
 93 Landau, supra note 7, at 235.  
 94 Id. at 235 n.246. 
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public opinion and earn for itself a place in the political dynamics.  Ricardo 
L. Lorenzetti, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Argentina, explains this 
legitimacy-seeking strategy as follows:  
 In a not very distant future, we hope to have a Judiciary that 
takes on and performs the role of cooperating in the large 
transformations needed in our country.  And I say this because 
the judicial branches of government have historically been 
conceived as vehicles for preservation of the existing order; but 
in the last few years, much has been done in the realms of legal 
scholarship, jurisprudence, and all the areas in which we are 
usually involved toward seeing the Judiciary as an institutional 
player that is also engaged in the transformation of society and 
not merely in its preservation.  And in this transformation of 
society, we have a most significant part to play. . . .  In this 
regard, the Judiciary, together with the other branches of 
government, must operate as a driver of institutional 
transformation by means of judicial and institutional decisions 
alike. . . .  This is thus the role that we envision for the 
Judiciary: an active participant role in the public agenda of 
fundamental civic issues, oriented toward transformation and 
allowing for participation in major government decisions.95 
Second, Argentina provides an apposite case for a comparative study in 
view of the profound influence that American constitutional law has 
historically had there.  Following the constitutional conventions of 1853 and 
1860, Argentina promulgated its first formal constitution patterned primarily 
on American constitutional thought.  Although the Argentine constitutional 
process drew on other specific influences, it remains true that the design of 
the fundamental structure of the Argentine Constitution was guided by the 
letter and the spirit of the U.S. Constitution.96  As stated by José Benjamín 
Gorostiaga, intellectual leader of the 1853 Constitutional Convention, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 95 See Ricardo L. Lorenzetti, C.J., Sup. Ct. of Argentina, Opening Speech for the Judicial 
Year 2011 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1D6P9ApajUc. 
 96 See, e.g., MANUEL J. GARCÍA-MANSILLA & RICARDO RAMÍREZ CALVO, LAS FUENTES DE 
LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (2006).  But see RODOLFO RIVAROLA, LA CONSTITUCIÓN 
ARGENTINA Y SUS PRINCIPIOS DE ÉTICA POLÍTICA (1944) (criticizing the opinion that the 
Argentine Constitution is merely a copy of the U.S. Constitution and may be fairly interpreted 
by applying U.S. precedents). 
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Argentine Constitution was “cast in the mold of the Constitution of the 
United States.”97 
Despite obvious historical and cultural differences between both 
countries, Argentina followed the U.S. Constitution in laying the 
groundwork for its organization. Thus, Argentina adopted a written 
Constitution providing for a federal government, presidentialist in form, with 
a system of separated and coordinated powers that exercise reciprocal checks 
and balances, and limited by a bill of rights.  In addition, expressly citing 
Marbury v. Madison,98 the Supreme Court of Argentina espoused strong-
form judicial review, as theretofore exercised by its counterpart in the United 
States.99  Consequently, to the extent that there are fundamental constituent 
elements common to both countries and that the Supreme Court of Argentina 
continues to be strongly influenced by its American counterpart, it may be 
asserted that a comparison of both legal systems is pertinent and there are 
lessons to be drawn from one system for consideration in the other.  
There is, however, an obvious distinguishing trait of particular 
significance to the issues under consideration. Argentina is a civil law 
country while the structural remedies granted within the framework of Public 
Law Litigation may be seen as a logical and foreseeable development of the 
social rulemaking function traditionally associated with the role of common 
law judges.100 
In this regard, it has been stated that the various players within the 
common law system accept “that one of the hallmarks of public law 
litigation is that it will generate norms that govern people not parties to the 
litigation,”101 meaning that it is accepted from both a legal and a political 
standpoint that litigation can have “important consequences for many 
persons including absentees.”102  Naturally, this approach defines both the 
way in which judges and lawyers understand that their work should be done 
and the expectations held by society in this regard.  
This difference is not confined to the sphere of judicial culture, but rather 
takes a concrete form in certain characteristics of the law of procedure, such 
                                                                                                                                                       
 97 4 EMILIO RAVIGNIANI, ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 468 (1939).  
 98 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 99 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
20/9/1887, “Sojo v. Cámara de Diputados,” Fallos (1887-32-120) (Arg.). 
 100 Fiss, supra note 5, at 36 (arguing that the function of courts under the common law was 
paradigmatically not dispute resolution, but to give meaning to public values through the 
enforcement and creation of public norms). 
 101 Appel, supra note 8, at 221. 
 102 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1302 (1976). 
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as the regulation of class actions and the existence of equitable jurisdiction 
(which gives rise to the remedies known generically as equitable relief and, 
as a part thereof, the widespread category of injunctions).  As noted by 
Argentine scholars, “the strong legalistic and administrative-leaning tradition 
of continental European law, which has influenced Argentine law to such a 
large degree, departs, to our detriment, from the generous intervention of 
common law judges in shaping the operation of class actions.”103 
It follows that a comparative analysis and the development of a set of 
practical rules aimed at establishing when and under what factual and legal 
circumstances structural remedies can be effective should only be undertaken 
with the understanding that any difficulties or limitations that may have been 
encountered in the United States in this field are coupled by the challenges 
posed by a law of procedure typical of a civil law system and a legal culture 
flowing from the continental European tradition. 
B.  Institutional Alternatives 
When faced with a polycentric conflict in which the broad catalog of 
fundamental rights embraced by the Constitution may become subject to 
judicial review and enforcement of the judgment should be mediated through 
government agencies, the Argentine Judiciary can choose from a wide 
variety of options. 
A first alternative available to the Argentine courts, just like to their 
counterparts in the United States, consists of making use of some of “passive 
virtues”104 and avoiding or postponing a final judgment in the hope that the 
conflict will be better resolved on the political front.  The Supreme Court of 
Argentina has followed the line of decisions adopted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court whereby constitutional review is limited to the existence of a 
justiciable “case or controversy.”105  As a result, the courts have leeway to 
act strategically and to rely on both procedural defects and substantive 
doctrines (such as those concerning political questions, legislative or 
administrative discretion, ripeness, mootness, and lack of standing) to avoid 
making rash decisions.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 103 HUMBERTO QUIROGA LAVIÉ, EL AMPARO COLECTIVO 171 (1998). 
 104 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (2d ed. 1986). 
 105 Despite the current trend toward eliminating formal barriers for access to the courts, there 
are still numerous examples of the traditional view in present-day case law.  See, e.g., Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], “Compañía de 
Transmisión del Mercosur,” Fallos (2009-332-1433) (Arg.). 
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In addition, as the Argentine system is a federal system, the courts have 
the possibility of raising procedural issues to have the case removed to other 
jurisdictions.106  Specifically in connection with social rights, the courts may, 
under certain circumstances, invoke the absence of adequate legal 
regulation,107 the principle of “progressive realization,”108 or a lack of 
budgetary resources.  
A second alternative available to the courts is to issue a decision 
upholding the claim before them while ensuring that such decision will not 
impact directly on public policy or on the underlying social conditions. 
Decisions rendered on a case-by-case basis may thus sustain the complaints 
filed without probing into the deep causes of the source conflict.  
Using this minimalist approach, the Argentine Supreme Court has issued 
favorable decisions and satisfied the specific claims asserted by individuals 
or groups who brought the complaint but without demanding any structural 
change in public policies or in the existing administrative dynamics.  Within 
the framework of this second scheme, the Supreme Court is often very 
careful to underscore the singularity of the facts and circumstances of the 
case in order to prevent the decision from being only too readily relied upon 
and applied by other courts.109 
                                                                                                                                                       
 106 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
12/3/2002, “Ramos v. Buenos Aires,” (2002-325-396) (Arg.), the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for a food subsidy and a housing solution filed by a woman with eight children and in 
a state of extreme poverty.  The Court ruled that the “amparo” expedited procedure was 
inappropriate, lack of proof, and that the primary obligation for food and housing support 
relies on the family, not the state. In addition, the Court said that these types of claims should 
be heard by local jurisdictions, and not federal courts. 
 107 In “Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich,” CSJN, Fallos (1992-315-1492), the Supreme Court ruled 
that human rights enshrined in international instruments are legally binding and should be 
presumed operative and directly enforceable, even without legislation at the national level.  
However, in “Quisberth Castro,” CSJN, Fallos (2012-335-452), a case dealing with the right 
to adequate housing, the Supreme Court ruled that some rights have only “derivative” 
enforceability, meaning that is necessary to pass legislation at the national level before a claim 
could be filed in court. 
 108 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 16, 1966.  
 109 A good example of this strategy is “Quisberth Castro,” CSJN, Fallos (2012-335-452).  In 
this case, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning the right to adequate housing in the 
City of Buenos Aires.  Here, the Court avoided a general ruling on the constitutionality of the 
city’s housing policy and, instead, decided the case on purely individual grounds, considering 
plaintiff’s special situation of extreme vulnerability.   
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that it will not 
regard a certain judgment as a precedent applicable to other pending 
issues.110 
In this scenario, it is usually the case that any benefit that the Supreme 
Court decides to accord does not typically consist of one created by the Court 
itself.  Rather, the Supreme Court will act to restore existing benefits, which 
the political branches of government have previously regulated and are 
contemplated in the appropriate budget but which, for some reason, have 
been arbitrarily suspended or removed.111 
Finally, a third institutional alternative available to the courts is to 
undertake the reform of existing public policies to remedy the underlying 
structural failures that account for a repeated violation of certain rights.  In 
adopting this standpoint, which is truly innovative, the Argentine Supreme 
Court has taken two different approaches.  
The first entails the use of what are known as exhortatory judgments.  
Here the Supreme Court rules a certain governmental omission 
unconstitutional and urges the public authorities to pass the laws and 
implement such policies to comply with constitutional mandates.  A process 
of institutional dialogue thus begins.  The Judiciary confines itself to setting 
the guidelines for future action by the political authorities112 and awaits the 
initiative of the other branches of government.  
The second approach, adopted by the Supreme Court in recent years, 
entails the most heightened, activist-driven form of intervention and consists 
                                                                                                                                                       
 110 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
26/11/2007, “Badaro v. ANSES,” (2007-330-4866) (Arg.).  In this case, the Supreme Court 
expressly ruled that the decision would only apply to the particular case, and not to others in a 
similar situation. 
 111 This situation is frequent in cases dealing with the right to health.  In Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], “Asociación 
Benghalensis,” (2000-323-1339) (Arg.), the Supreme Court ruled that the state should restore 
treatment and provision of medicine for patients with HIV/AIDS.  In Corte Suprema de 
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 24/10/2000, “Campodónico 
de Beviacqua,”(2000-323-3229) (Arg.), the Supreme Court decided that the state should 
restore benefits for patients with Kostman’s disease, and in “Asociación de Esclerosis 
Múltiple de Salta,” CSJN, Fallos (2003-326-4931), the Court ruled that the state could not 
legally interrupt ongoing treatments benefiting patients with multiple sclerosis. 
 112 An example of this position is Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National 
Supreme Court of Justice], 8/8/2006, “Badaro v. ANSES,” (2006-329-3089) (Arg.).  In this 
case, the Supreme Court urged Congress to establish a mechanism for the automatic 
adjustment of plaintiff’s social pension.  In Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] 
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 23/5/2007 “Rosza,” (2007-330-2361) (Arg.), the 
Supreme Court urged Congress to enact within a year a new valid regime for the appointment 
of interim federal judges, setting guidelines that the new regulation should follow. 
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of the use of structural remedies.  Particularly noteworthy are the decisions 
rendered in Verbitsky113 and Mendoza.114  These are two cases in which the 
Supreme Court attempted a far-reaching structural reform model with a 
managerial flavor, in an effort to reshape the dynamics underlying the 
violation of fundamental rights. In both cases, the Supreme Court explicitly 
invoked the experience in the United States to justify the introduction of 
judgment enforcement mechanisms allowing it to formulate and monitor 
plans for management and reform of the bureaucratic system held 
responsible for the constitutional breach.  
C.  Prison Reform: Verbitsky 
Verbitsky is the first case in which the Supreme Court of Argentina 
attempted the adoption of structural remedies, expressly citing the experience 
in the United States in this field.115  The case began when Horacio Verbitsky, 
a public figure with close links to the federal government,116 and 
representative of the NGO Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), 
brought a corrective and collective habeas corpus action before the Court of 
Cassation of the Province of Buenos Aires.  He invoked the defense of all 
persons deprived of their freedom in the Province of Buenos Aires, detained 
in police stations or overcrowded penal facilities. 
As regards the merits of the case, the existence of an overloaded prison 
system in the Province of Buenos Aires was successfully established.  CELS 
provided evidence of cases of overcrowding, promiscuity among inmates, 
lack of special facilities for minors, and cells in dreadful sanitary and health 
conditions. 
As explained by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the decision was 
made to review the case as “a structural case or structural reform lawsuit, in 
the language used in Anglo-Saxon legal literature, owing to its complexity 
and size.”117  In 2005 the Supreme Court ruled against the Province of 
Buenos Aires and imposed a number of enforcement measures aimed at 
                                                                                                                                                       
 113 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
“Verbitsky, Horacio / Habeas Corpus,” (2005-328-1146) (Arg.). 
 114 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
20/3/2007, “Mendoza, Beatriz v. Estado Nacional,” (2007-330-1158) (Arg.). 
 115 In Verbitsky, the Supreme Court of Argentina cites U.S. cases such as Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678 (1978), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and the work of LYNN S. 
BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS (2002). 
 116 Cf. Hipoteca Invisible, La Nación (Arg.) (Sept. 15, 2013).  
 117 RICARDO L. LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA 47 (2010). 
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modifying the then-existing prison conditions.  Among such measures, it was 
ordered that the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires, acting 
through the competent lower courts, have the detention of minors and sick 
persons in police stations within the province brought to an end within a 
period of sixty days.  Provincial courts were likewise directed to put an end 
to any worsening of detention conditions entailing cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment.  The Executive and the Legislature of the province were 
also urged to bring the province’s legislation into line with the “United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners” adopted 
by Law No. 24660.118  The Supreme Court required that these basic 
guidelines should govern any detention or deprivation of freedom. 
Most innovative in this case was the establishment of a methodology 
based on institutional dialogue and negotiation.  An upside of the decision 
was the order directed to the Province of Buenos Aires to set up a “Dialogue 
Table” together with certain leading NGOs, with the attendant duty to report 
every sixty days on the progress made.119  The agenda was quite open, to the 
extent that the judgment did not provide any detailed guidelines on key 
matters such as the specific characteristics of prison infrastructure or the 
definition of budgetary goals.  
Regarding compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision and its actual 
impact over time, there have been mixed results and varying degrees of 
consistency in meeting each of the points addressed in it.  As far as the 
exhortation to reform the provincial legislation is concerned, it received 
strong political support and an immediate response from the provincial 
Legislature.  For example, provincial Law No. 13449120 was passed in 2006, 
introducing substantial amendments in the province’s Code of Criminal 
Procedure in the area of pretrial detention and release from custody.  Many 
other sets of provisions have since been enacted in this regard.  Scholars 
specializing in this field note that the international guidelines cited by the 
Supreme Court merely state that pretrial detention should be “exceptional,” 
which is not a clear enough standard to guide reform.121  This explains why 
the rules enacted are not thoroughly appropriate and have encountered 
criticism.122  Witnessing to this lack of satisfactory results is the fact that the 
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total number of pretrial detainees in the Province of Buenos Aires only 
dropped slightly throughout the process, from 24,576 in 2005 to 19,605 in 
2014.123  After nine years of litigation, the percentage of pretrial detainees 
over the total amount of inmates is still above 60% without any significant 
change over the past four years.124 
Another fact that shows a lack of results in this area is that the total 
number of inmates in the Province of Buenos Aires rose 33.2% from 2007 to 
2014.  As of 2014, this figure is at its peak over the last fifteen years,125 and 
has led to a scenario in which twenty-nine of the fifty-six prison facilities are 
filled beyond capacity126 with no serious infrastructure improvement under 
way.127 
As for the Supreme Court’s orders directed to eradicating the detention of 
minors and sick persons in police stations, the results are ambivalent.  On the 
one hand, the province’s Supreme Court itself held, based on a report from 
the Provincial “Memory Commission,” that these types of detentions had 
been eradicated and were forbidden in the future, so it deemed the problem 
to be formally solved.128  However, there are claims that this kind of illegal 
detention still occurs in the so-called “Transitory Centers,”129 which would 
not suit the needs of minors.  Moreover, this aspect of the decision has given 
rise to paradoxical, undesired effects, as there have been minors who have 
filed habeas corpus petitions requesting to be kept in overcrowded cells at 
police stations to avoid being transferred to facilities distant from their usual 
place of residence.130 
In connection with the number of adult detainees in police stations, CELS 
reported that efforts to decrease it were successful at first: the number 
dropped from 6,055 in 2004, to 2,782 in 2007.131  Nevertheless, limited 
engagement on the part of the province’s public authorities to correct the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 123 CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, A CUATRO MESES DE LA EMERGENCIA EN 
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situation once and for all led to a marked reversal of this downward trend.  In 
2009 the number climbed to 4,552 detainees.132  It has been claimed that this 
drop in police station detentions is artificial and has been achieved at the 
expense of worsening overall prison conditions.133 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court itself urged the governor of the 
Province of Buenos Aires to remedy the situation, but the problem persisted. 
Although the official number declined to approximately 1,069 in 2011,134 a 
recent report published by CELS has shown that by 2014 the real figure was 
above 3,000.135  The cause of this major setback is explained because in May 
2014 the governor launched a crime prevention plan in which long-term 
detentions in police stations were once again authorized,136 openly defying 
the Supreme Court ruling.  This plan has been legally challenged, but until 
now these suits were dismissed.137 
As regards this last issue, linked to overall detention conditions, it has 
been noted that the most serious plight is not the deficit in cells or beds but 
the fact that violence continues to be part and parcel of the structure and 
culture of the prison system,138 and has grown considerably in recent 
years.139  Riots among inmates are a common occurrence, exacerbated by 
deplorable living conditions.  This triggers episodes of harsh repression 
leading, in turn, to increased friction and new outbreaks of violence. 
Finally, reference should be made to the purely procedural side of 
Verbitsky, namely the establishment of a “Dialogue Table” involving 
provincial authorities and NGOs.  While dialogue was intense during the first 
two years after the judgment was issued, it then came to a complete 
standstill.  A recurrent problem was the lack of representation of the various 
government agencies with jurisdiction in the area, which barred any 
substantial headway in planning.140  Beginning in 2007, claims were made 
that the new provincial authorities hindered the operation of this mechanism, 
thus neutralizing its effectiveness.141 
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It should be borne in mind that the figures in this field are manipulated by 
government agencies, such that they are scarcely reliable as the basis for a 
conclusive opinion on the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision.  There 
seems to be consensus that it had a moderately positive impact in the first 
years, but the initiative then lost political support and the situation became 
one of stalemate and clear retrogression on certain issues.  
This failure may be due to the low level of commitment of the provincial 
authorities.  It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Argentina did not 
remand its decision to the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires, 
which, to some extent, may explain the lack of engagement on the part of 
local political and judicial authorities to tackle the task of formulating long-
term solutions.  The Supreme Court of Argentina has thus called for “active 
involvement of the provincial Judiciary in matters that are vital to the 
enforcement of the remedy, but has done without the involvement of the 
provincial courts in the definition of the problem.”142  It is also notable that 
the Supreme Court’s decision did not impose any specific sanctions for 
noncompliance with or failure to abide by the demands made therein. 
In summary, scholars have highlighted in recent years the difficulties 
inherent in standing by the decision in Verbitsky.  In 2009, it was asserted 
that the minimum objective “is still far from achievement,”143 as CELS itself 
then denounced that “excessive population density and overcrowding 
continue to loom large at detention centers in the province” and that “the 
current scenario is one of clear retrogression vis-à-vis the progress attained 
during the two years immediately following the ruling in Verbitsky.”144  As 
political support for this initiative on the part of the province’s authorities 
dwindled after 2009, it is not surprising to hear that the situation of detainees 
has not improved in practice, let alone substantially, nor is it possible to say 
that minors are currently held in appropriate facilities.145  It follows that nine 
years after the Supreme Court’s decision, the perception among both public 
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opinion and experts is that the ruling “continues to be difficult, if not 
impossible, to comply with.”146 
D.  The Environment: Mendoza 
Mendoza is a case deriving from a claim filed by seventeen persons due 
to environmental contamination at the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. In the 
complaint, the plaintiffs sought monetary compensation, an end to pollution, 
and environmental remediation.  In so doing, they claimed that the federal 
government, the Province of Buenos Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires 
should be held liable.  At the same time, they filed suit against forty-four 
polluting companies for discharging hazardous waste directly into the river 
without having built any treatment plants.  It should be recalled that close to 
5,000,000 people live in the basin of this river, one of the most heavily 
polluted worldwide.  
The lawsuit was not commenced as a class action but as an ordinary civil 
proceeding under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Argentina.  The Supreme Court issued a first judgment on June 20, 2006 
holding that a distinction should be made between individual and collective 
interests.147  The action for damages sustained by each individual was to be 
pursued following the ordinary procedural steps before the lower courts.  At 
the same time, the Supreme Court ruled itself competent to hear the claim 
regarding the collective interest, aimed at the remediation of the riverbed and 
the prevention of future damage.148  
A proceeding characterized as an “expedited environmental proceeding 
without specific legal regulation”149 thus commenced, sparking great interest 
among the public.  Requests for information and public hearings then 
followed, through which the parties involved regularly briefed the Supreme 
Court.  
Throughout 2006, the Supreme Court focused on determining who would 
be the parties to the action, as there were no distinct pre-established criteria 
for these types of cases.  The decisions rendered in this regard spurred action 
by Congress, and at the end of 2006, it passed Law No. 26168.150  The result 
was the creation of the Matanza-Riachuelo Basin Authority (Autoridad de la 
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Cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo) (ACUMAR) as an interjurisdictional body 
governed by public law. 
Following a special reporting procedure and several other public hearings, 
the Supreme Court passed judgment on July 8, 2008.151  What is especially 
worth noting is that it was forward-looking in its vision, defining general 
objectives as well as “the guidelines that the Basin Authority is to follow 
regarding public reporting requirements, contamination originating from 
industrial activities, remediation of waste dumps, cleanup of river banks, 
expansion of the drinking water network, rainwater drain systems, sewerage, 
and emergency sanitation plan.”152 
In short, this decision ordered the Federal Government, the Province of 
Buenos Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires to comply with a mandatory 
program called Comprehensive Environmental Remediation Plan (Plan 
Integral de Saneamiento Ambiental) (PISA) for the Matanza-Riachuelo 
Basin. The public agency responsible for compliance with PISA is 
ACUMAR, chaired by Argentina’s Secretary for the Environment and 
Sustainable Development and also made up of representatives of the three 
jurisdictions held responsible.  
In this same ruling, the Supreme Court made a decision not covered by 
any legal provisions and otherwise unprecedented, whereby it delegated the 
judgment enforcement procedure to a federal trial court in the city of 
Quilmes.153  For the purposes of such enforcement task, the Supreme Court 
vested this lower court with exclusive jurisdiction of all matters associated 
with compliance with the judgment for relief and all cases relating to 
collective environmental damage in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin.  The 
lower court was also to act as a reviewing court in respect of all 
administrative acts issuing from ACUMAR. All decisions made by the 
federal court in the exercise of the delegation of authority received may be 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.154 
Additionally, the decision granted powers to the enforcement court to 
direct the investigation of crimes deriving from noncompliance with the 
orders made in the decision and to apply and set the amount of fines for 
failure to fulfill the obligations spelled out in it. 
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The ruling also noted that failure to adhere to any of the deadlines set out 
in the program would result in the accrual of a daily fine to be enforced by 
the chair of ACUMAR.  The Supreme Court also entrusted the Office of the 
Federal Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) and certain NGOs (Asociación 
Ciudadana por los Derechos Humanos [ACDH], Asociación de Vecinos de 
La Boca [AVLB], CELS, Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
[FARN] and Greenpeace) with the formation of a collective body charged 
with monitoring PISA, as well as with representing the public interest within 
the process of enforcement of the judgment and fostering citizen 
involvement.155  In reference to the scope of the directives given by the 
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lorenzetti explained that no detailed 
procedures were established for the administrative authorities to follow. 
Rather, the Supreme Court limited itself to setting “objectives, including a 
description of stages according to the various sources of contamination and 
the timelines to be met.”156 
On the basis of this particular institutional structure, framed specially to 
accommodate this process, work got underway.  But one year after the 
Supreme Court’s decision was passed, critics began pointing to instances of 
noncompliance with the plan and non-observance of the timelines.157  Two 
years after its ruling, the Supreme Court issued a harsh decision admitting 
that “two years having passed since such ruling, and despite continuous 
demands from the judge vested with delegated authority, there is evidence of 
instances of noncompliance for which no sufficient justification has been 
provided”158 and threatened to impose fines on the officers involved.  
More than eight years after the beginning of the proceedings, it can be 
asserted that Mendoza managed to seize the public attention.  The Supreme 
Court’s initiative, coupled with the initial political support of the federal 
government, enabled the adoption of measures that only entail, however, 
isolated instances of progress.  Among the identified problems, especially 
serious is the difficulty in coordinating multijurisdictional action.  ACUMAR 
is made up of three states aligned with different political parties that are at 
loggerheads with each other.  In addition, the economic interests of the 
riverside companies have been brought to bear on the plan.  
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The official data, which ACUMAR submitted to the Supreme Court in 
2013,159 shows that headway has been made in eradicating contaminating 
industries in the Dock Sud area; 69% of open-air waste dumps have likewise 
been eradicated, and various waste treatment measures have been adopted in 
fourteen municipalities; the towpath has been cleared, and some 1,059 
families have been relocated; numerous measures have been implemented to 
provide medical care to those affected by environmental hazards; and 
campaigns have been launched for ongoing monitoring of water and air 
quality at various spots within the basin.  
Nonetheless, other reliable, independent sources claim that the advances 
are not as significant as maintained by ACUMAR, as the means employed to 
resolve some of the conflicts underlying the issue are insufficient in 
proportion to existing risks and the damage suffered by both the inhabitants 
and the environment.  A report prepared by the General Auditing Office of 
the Nation (Auditoría General de la Nación) (AGN) shows under-executions 
of the budget’s appropriations and that the results submitted by ACUMAR 
have been particularly unclear, which impedes an objective assessment of 
any headway made in the relevant areas.160 
For example, according to official figures, there are 12,701 production 
facilities on the banks of the river, of which 6,949 are industrial facilities and 
a mere 177 have completed the Industrial Reconversion Program.161  This 
suggests that the pace of progress is inadequate.162 
In the case of open-air waste dumps, a major regression has occurred. 
Internal audit units of ACUMAR concluded in an undisclosed report that in 
eleven municipalities almost 70% of the waste dumps that were previously 
closed, reappeared within a year.163  In addition, the report reveals a complete 
lack of surveillance and that waste containers were placed in only 3% of 
these locations.  According to the press, this situation is attributable to the 
lack of engagement of local authorities.164 
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With regard to family relocations, one leading NGO, Fundación 
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), has argued that despite the progress 
claimed by the authorities, quality of life has not improved substantially, in 
view of the poor basic living conditions in the new homes.165  In agreement 
with this evaluation, the Federal Ombudsman has also raised the issue and 
denounced a lack of concern for the rights of relocated persons.166 
As for the Remediation Plan, the policies put into effect have also been 
the object of bitter criticism owing to the absence of a proactive approach to 
health care issues and a lack of preventive intervention.  Among other things, 
this explains the claims that there is still a large number of children with 
harmful lead content in their blood.167 
Specifically in connection with water quality, Greenpeace has shown that 
there are no tangible improvements or a measurable trend toward better 
quality of surface waters, which continue to be severely contaminated.168  
They still exhibit high levels of heavy metals like lead and chromium and of 
organic matter, while oxygen levels have declined to nil, all of which helps 
to cause a deleterious impact.  An independent study published in 2013 
found that 80% of water samples taken from wells near the Matanza-
Riachuelo river basin were not safe for drinking due to contamination.169 
Overall, there are no stable, comprehensive policies targeting the 
substantive issues that lie at the core of this environmental degradation such 
that any partial advances may become permanent.  Clearly, there are no 
adequate controls over the disposal of industrial waste into the river, which is 
the primary reason why it continues to be contaminated.  In recent years, the 
problem has been compounded by a lack of political engagement, which is 
only corroborated by the serious difficulty observed from the very beginning 
in ensuring the availability of funds for the required tasks.170 
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Responsibility for the day-to-day execution of these plans fell with a 
lower court in Quilmes, supported with vast resources, personnel, and 
substantial decision-making power.  An ad hoc procedure, not otherwise 
contemplated by law, was implemented which included the power not only 
to impose fines but also to order temporary arrests.  But as was to be 
expected, the AGN verified the existence of irregularities and a lack of 
transparency in several remediation projects.  The large amount of power 
concentrated in the judge, unrestrained by the absence of a clear-cut legal 
framework, led to abuses and claims of corruption, which ultimately 
prompted the Supreme Court to remove the judge from his position and to 
file criminal charges against him.171  The outcome has been that the Mendoza 
case is now at a complete deadlock.  
Consequently, it may be asserted that the remediation efforts undertaken 
by the Judiciary have so far achieved some progress in certain specific areas 
and have otherwise succeeded in placing the issue on the public agenda.  But 
as far as measurable results are concerned, the expectations among experts as 
well as the public have not been satisfied, as shown by the aforementioned 
reports, the press,172 the University of Buenos Aires,173 and legal scholars.174 
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A number of lessons may be drawn from the Public Law Litigation 
experience in the United States and in Argentina. In this regard, it is possible 
to identify a set of principles that make up a model that may prove useful to 
analyze legal frameworks and practices in both countries.  The comparative 
analysis will show if these principles are complied with in each country and 
to what extent they may be deemed as generally valid.  
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to distinguish those principles that 
have a political connotation from those that are purely technical.  The 
political conditions listed below are descriptive rather than normative in 
nature, and allow for an analysis of the role that the courts will need to 
perform in their interaction with other power-holders.  The discovery of 
generally valid technical requirements carries a normative edge.  They 
encompass certain issues relating to the legal framework deemed 
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indispensable for the decisions of the Judiciary to have a measurable impact 
on reality.  
A.  Political Conditions 
1.  Coordination with the Political Branches 
One of the most controversial claims of the leading U.S. scholars in this 
field is that when it comes to the political conditions, no judicially driven 
reform will have a significant and sustained impact without a consensus 
among the public and the coordinated and collaborative action of the political 
branches of government.175 
The American experience shows us that it is not clear at all that the 
Judiciary, acting alone, is able to exert a decisive influence on public opinion 
regarding a specific issue or to overcome even localized resistance to change 
in the operation of bureaucratic agencies.  At the same time, it is possible to 
observe that the activity of the courts is ineffective when coping with adverse 
public opinion nationwide or with ongoing conflict between the political 
departments of the federal government. 
As discussed above, desegregation in the South yielded tangible results 
upon the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorized the 
federal government to cut off federal funds to school districts engaged in 
racial discrimination.176  It was through joint action on the part of all three 
branches of government that real change started to unfold. Judicial activity, 
in and of itself, was no agent of change.  As explained by Tushnet, only 
when “faced with the prospect of losing access to federal funds, school 
systems desegregated.”177 
This political perspective sheds light on the true role that courts play in 
reform movements.  Courts are “quite important to these movements, but 
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they are not the sole player, and often not even the most important player.”178  
Where judicial action is not supported by the elective branches of the federal 
government or in cases of stark opposition to stances firmly adopted by 
interest groups, judicial action “is usually unsuccessful, and any court 
decisions in one’s favor are likely to meet with considerable popular 
resistance,”179 such that they prove ineffectual.180  This is not only to the 
detriment of the affected groups, whose desire for change will remain 
unfulfilled, but it also jeopardizes the authority and prestige of the Judiciary.  
It follows that in matters of structural reform, judicial activity must, to the 
extent possible, be implemented strategically, encouraging power-holders to 
cooperate in a sustained fashion over time.181  The support and cooperation 
of administrators in middle levels of bureaucracies is especially meaningful 
for judicial activity to be fruitful, as it is primarily the officers in such levels 
that are likely to be affected by reforms.  When judicial action succeeds, it 
provides cover or a tool for leverage in the relationship of a bureaucracy with 
the legislative and the executive branches, or when “administrators and staff 
are willingly involved in negotiation, change can occur.”182 
The experience in Argentina seems to confirm these controversial 
insights. The cases selected by the Supreme Court to undertake structural 
reform have not met with opposition on the part of the other branches of 
federal government or of majority public opinion.  On the contrary, the initial 
momentum gained in Verbitsky and Mendoza was in line with initiatives 
advocated by the federal government and its allies.  Then, when active 
support from the elective branches waned, reforms came to a standstill and 
even retrogression became apparent.  
In Verbitsky, the nub of the case was the question of prison conditions, 
and while not a priority issue among public opinion, it has not encountered 
resistance.  As for the posture taken by the political branches, recall that 
Horacio Verbitsky, a journalist and chair of an NGO very close to the federal 
government, commenced the case.  However, once the initial stage was 
completed, the case came to a standstill, as discussed above.  This was 
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particularly noticeable following changes in the provincial government and 
the election of Daniel Scioli.  Scioli is a governor from the same political 
party as the federal government, but from a different faction than the one led 
by Verbitsky.  It is thus patent that results were obtained when coordinated 
action existed between the Supreme Court, the federal government, and the 
provincial government.  When this alignment wore thin, the Province of 
Buenos Aires withdrew its support, the case reached a stalemate, and some 
of the results achieved were reversed.  
The environmental issues in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin that gave 
rise to Mendoza had been a matter of concern among various political parties 
in the national political arena—or so they had seemed to be in their political 
talk.  In subsequent years, the issue continued to raise concern among 
political parties and public opinion; promises were reiterated but no results 
were ever in sight. During the Néstor Kirchner Administration and the first 
years of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s presidency, the environmental 
question was given a boost by the Executive, in parallel with the decision in 
Mendoza.  In tackling the issue, the Supreme Court used arguments similar 
to those deployed by the federal government, and in deciding the case, it held 
several districts and private players liable.  Within this context, Congress 
expressly endorsed the initiative by passing Law No. 26168, whereby 
ACUMAR was created.  In the enforcement stage, the Supreme Court 
remained aligned with the federal government, as evidenced by the fact that 
the remediation tasks were delegated to the federal court of Quilmes, a 
district politically close to the Executive.  
But like in Verbitsky, the support of the political authorities in executing 
the plans gradually eroded.  Aware of the lack of commitment and 
inefficiency of some of the agencies and local authorities who had the duty to 
comply with the remediation plan, the Supreme Court urged those involved 
into action, but was met with a tepid response, if at all.183  What we have 
today is an issue that was removed from the political parties’ platforms and a 
judicial case caught in a quagmire amid corruption scandals.  
Thus, the Argentine experience shows that the Supreme Court has not put 
structural remedies at odds with the agenda of the political branches of 
government or of public opinion.  Rather, evidence suggests that in these 
cases, the Supreme Court initially acted in accord with the central 
government and that the judicial proceedings lagged behind precisely 
because, among other reasons, political support eroded over time and 
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coordination with central government political players eventually 
disappeared.  
2.  Authority of the Judiciary 
As pointed out in the preceding section, the support for reform processes 
from public opinion and the political branches of government is usually 
inconsistent.  To ensure the continuity of reforms, the Judiciary would have 
to assert its force at some critical instances.  In this regard, the experience in 
the United States shows that in the cases in which structural remedies had a 
sustained impact over time, it was crucial for the Judiciary to have enough 
authority to empower the judges to undertake the administration of resources 
before they got into the hands of traditional political players.  What is more, 
along with the need for legal instruments of coercion to operate as an 
assurance that the judicial decision will be complied with in a timely manner, 
there is the need for the political system to be mature enough to regard any 
act of disobedience of a court order as intolerable.  
This notion, which looks elementary enough, is most often taken for 
granted or otherwise not analyzed in depth by legal scholars.  It is 
nonetheless the key concept on which the system of judicial structural reform 
pivots in the United States.  Chayes was among the first to note this, 
indicating that judges in the United States could carry out these functions 
effectively “only by drawing on the legitimacy and moral force that courts 
have developed through the performance of their inherent function, 
adjudication according to the traditional conception.”184  This means that, 
unlike the situation in other countries, the experience in the United States is 
largely accounted for by the “independence and prestige of the federal 
judiciary.”185  It is within a system having these characteristics, in which the 
courts have earned for themselves a significant position of power and 
legitimacy, that they have managed to use their authority to propel social 
change.  
The school desegregation and prison reform cases in the United States 
demonstrate that the starting point for activation of the structural reform 
system has been the strong affirmation of judicial authority.  In the case of 
schools, lower court judges in the southern states had a difficult task in the 
beginning, since they could only rely on the nominal support of the highest 
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court in the land.186  In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Supreme 
Court to make full use of its authority and legitimacy to overcome resistance 
from the political system and to explicitly endorse the reform process.  Fiss 
underscores this aspect of the process, saying that, “[a]t critical junctures—
Cooper v. Aaron, the faculty desegregation cases of the mid-1960[s], and 
Green v. County School Board—the Warren Court stepped in,”187 thus 
preventing judicial efforts from coming to nothing.  
Once the judiciary has asserted its authority within the political system, 
the means required to ensure compliance with its decisions must be firmly 
established, either via statutory instruments or case law.  In the American 
system, the key components of this structure include the prerogative of the 
courts to penalize officials with fines or criminal sanctions for contempt188 in 
cases where “the wrongdoing largely consists of disobedience of judicial 
orders.”189  Thus, the most “prominent feature of structural injunctions is that 
the district court judge has very broad power to issue orders, to revise them 
as he or she sees fit, and to enforce them by threatening to hold violators in 
contempt of court.”190 
Only when the judiciary can carve out its distinct share of power vis-à-vis 
the other branches of government, and the technical means are in place to 
effectively penalize officials that do not abide by court orders, can a 
structural reform process begin to be regarded as feasible.  
This conclusion applies both to a strongly unilateral model, in which the 
judge designs and enforces a mandatory specific remedy, despite steadfast 
opposition from the defendant authority, and to modern multilateral or 
experimentalist models, in which the judge provides a forum for stakeholders 
to negotiate and devise a solution that will eventually be included in a 
voluntary settlement or consent decree.  Voluntary settlements or consent 
decrees may thus be negotiated by the parties, but they are conceived as a 
“written set of duties and deadlines with intermediate milestones, all backed 
up by the court’s power to hold the defendants in contempt.”191  Moreover, 
the authority of the court is needed not only as an assurance of the 
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commitments assumed, but also as the bedrock of the negotiation process.  
Advocates of multilateral models draw on this premise in devising solutions 
for structural reform. In this regard, Strum cautions that “the deliberative 
model does not assume or require that consensus be reached.  The model 
provides the backstop of a judicially-imposed remedy in the event the 
participants are unable to reach agreement.”192 
Charles Sabel and William Simon propose a form of intervention in 
which the judiciary becomes an appropriate forum for the destabilization of 
power structures that operate as a barrier to change, rather than as a source of 
solutions.  These authors suggest that the terms of decrees have altered over 
time, becoming more “flexible and provisional,” and more focused on 
“procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured 
accountability.”193  But even in these developed, flexible, experimentalist 
models, stakeholders can rely on the vital feature of the authority of the 
court, which does not serve merely as a “power broker” or forum for the 
discussion of remedies but rather provides the implicit and yet distinct 
possibility of decisive background intervention.  “These background 
sanctions function as a kind of ‘penalty default’—a result that no one is 
likely to prefer, intended to induce the parties to negotiate a better one.”194 
In Argentina, these critical conditions for judicially-driven reform are not 
fully satisfied.  The Supreme Court has resorted to high-profile structural 
reform cases in an effort to gain the legitimacy and political power it had not 
previously achieved.  The judiciary in Argentina does not have the prestige, 
tradition, or the institutional strength of its counterpart in the United States.  
During the twentieth century, Argentina, like most other Latin American 
countries, has fallen prey to coups, military regimes, and authoritarian 
democratic governments that have gradually eroded the independence and 
legitimacy of the judiciary.195  Even in times of democratic rule, the 
incumbents have managed to unseat Supreme Court members and to appoint 
judges of their own political complexion in their stead.  Since 1983, 
Argentina has succeeded in cementing stable democratic rule, but the 
Supreme Court still has undergone reshuffling to the detriment of its 
authority.  The number of Supreme Court justices was increased in 1990 and 
some of its members were impeached in 2002, 2003, and 2005. 
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As for the availability of technical instruments for enforcement, 
Argentina, like the United States, has mechanisms in place whereby criminal 
liability for contempt may be attached to those who willfully disregard 
judicial orders.196  Nevertheless, trial judges in the U.S. have more extensive 
power to declare someone in contempt than judges in civil law systems.  In 
Argentina, a court with criminal jurisdiction must prove the offender guilty 
in a special procedure before being punished.  Therefore, government 
officials do not perceive criminal sanctions as a real threat.  This has become 
patent in notorious cases of recent years, in which the orders of the Supreme 
Court have been met with blatant disobedience without any visible judicial or 
political consequences.197 
With regard to pecuniary penalties imposed on noncompliant officials 
personally, the traditional view was that they were a tool to coerce 
compliance with court-ordered measures.198  This approach has now been 
countered by Article 9 of the recently enacted Law No. 26854,199 which 
provides that courts may not impose pecuniary penalties on government 
officials personally.  Although this provision will probably be challenged as 
unconstitutional, it does lay bare the low-level commitment of the political 
branches when it comes to respect for the authority of the courts.  
In summary, this basic political condition is far from being fulfilled in 
Argentina.  The strategy of using structural remedies in aid of legitimization 
has helped the Supreme Court position itself more favorably in the eyes of 
the public, but has so far failed as a tool for decided assertion of its authority.  
Further, this deficiency is yet another reason that explains the discrete impact 
of judicial mandates over time, and specifically appears as a large obstacle to 
the successful implementation of structural remedies, whether in a unilateral 
or in a multilateral model.  
3.  Checks on the Judiciary 
Since structural remedies began to be used in the United States, scholars 
have noted that one major challenge would be how to establish a pattern of 
adequate control over the activity of the courts.  Once the department that is 
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constitutionally called upon to check on the political branches of government 
started to discharge managerial functions, the question arose as to which 
body would be fit to supervise the Judiciary.  This is a pertinent issue to raise 
from a theoretical standpoint, within a broader reading that calls into 
question the democratic legitimacy of a non-elected body that becomes a 
manager of public resources, as well as from a purely practical standpoint, 
with a view to averting instances of abuse of power or corruption.  
Clearly, to the extent that reform processes are postulated within the 
framework of legal discourse, it is institutionally difficult to implement some 
form of control by bodies outside of the Judiciary itself.200  Even so, it is 
crucial to introduce mechanisms capable of cabining the discretionary 
exercise of this new judicial function, as there is otherwise the risk that 
instances of abuse will undermine the legitimacy of both the judicial process 
and the background substantive claim, thus leading to typical cases of 
“judicial populism.”201  The early studies by Fiss already showed that 
American legal writers underlined that structural reform processes pose a 
political threat to the ideal of judicial independence, because “[t]he desire to 
be efficacious leads the judge to attempt the remarkable feat of 
reconstructing a state bureaucracy . . . and that ambition in turn forces the 
judge to abandon his position of independence and to enter the world of 
politics.”202 
In the United States, the courts themselves have brought to light cases of 
corruption or collusion with the judge or between the parties.  A strikingly 
illustrative example of this is Justice Lewis Powell’s accusation that parties 
in a desegregation case had “joined forces apparently for the purpose of 
extracting funds from the state treasury.”203 
While claims of corruption or abuse of authority on the part of judges in 
the United States did exist, they were discrete if compared to the number of 
cases in which structural remedies were used.  Therefore, it appears that in 
the United States the managerial role of the judge is not monitored by any 
formal body; rather, it suffices to have recourse in the general legal 
framework and in monitoring by the stakeholders involved.  
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In countries like Argentina, the danger of abuse of power and corruption 
on the part of judges within the context of structural reform cases is 
potentially more acute.  According to an international ranking compiled by 
Transparency International, Argentina ranks as low as 102nd among 176 
countries.204  Argentina also registers high levels of undue influence (140th), 
along with one of the lowest ratings in terms of trust in politicians (143rd), 
coupled with a very negative assessment of the institutional set-up (138th) 
according to a 2012–2013 report by the World Economic Forum.205  In 
particular, the institutions perceived as being the most corrupt in Argentina 
are political parties, government officials, Legislatures, the police, and also 
the Judiciary.206 
Specifically in connection with structural reform cases, the issue of 
corruption came dramatically onto the scene.  The federal judge responsible 
for enforcement in Mendoza, was summoned to step aside amid serious 
allegations of corruption and abuse of authority, which resulted in criminal 
charges being pressed even by the Supreme Court.  In removing him, the 
Supreme Court expressly stated that, as the case involved structural reform, 
he was to maximize caution in order to preserve “the confidence of society in 
the transparency of the procedures carried out.”207  Consequently, since 
November 2012, the Mendoza case, undeniably the most representative case 
championed by the Supreme Court in the structural reform scenario, “has 
been virtually at a standstill.”208 
In view of the different sociological and institutional contexts, it is thus 
plain that countries like Argentina are not readily prepared to count on the 
same control model as that in the United States.  The existence of higher 
corruption levels and of a weak legal and institutional frameworks to combat 
lack of transparency issues requires the implementation of tailor-made, 
innovative solutions.  It is necessary to provide for independent oversight of 
the actions of judges who become managers of sizeable amounts of public 
resources.  Among other alternatives, it is reasonable to induce a more 
prominent role to be played by institutions formally outside the Judiciary, 
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such as the AGN or the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation 
(“Ministerio Público Fiscal”) (MPF), as is the case in Brazil.209 
B.  Technical Requirements 
1.  Legal Regulation of Class Actions 
A distinctive feature of structural reform processes is that they are 
collective in scope since they do not center on an individual but on a 
“group.”210  This premise calls for a redefinition of the traditional notion of 
“party,” as the claimant appearing before the court does not exercise an 
individual and exclusive right, but rather asserts a right accruing to an 
indefinite number of people.  Clear-cut rules of procedure must thus be laid 
down whereby the court can determine “whether the interests of the victim 
group are adequately represented”211 as well as ensure that the basic 
requirements of due process and the right to a defense in court will be 
adhered to.  
As noted before, the procedural avenue available in the United States for 
the filing of the most successful cases concerning school desegregation and 
prison reform has been that of class actions, especially those litigated under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended in 1966.212  That year, a 
new system was mapped out to ensure that class members would be 
identified before the issuance of a final decision in the litigation and that they 
would be bound by it, except for special cases.  Additionally, the 1966 
“amendments introduced a more transactional approach to litigation and 
made the rules concerning party structure more flexible,”213 and were 
specifically aimed at the improved implementation of structural reform 
processes.214  At the core of this procedural device is certification of the 
class.  Among the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23215 is a general 
provision covering the various areas in which this instrument may be helpful, 
from civil rights suits to massive tort cases involving monetary claims.  
In the case of Public Law Litigation, which engenders structural 
remedies, the requirements that are usually satisfied for certification of a 
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class are those under Rule 23(b)(2).  Here, the decision on certification 
results in a so-called “mandatory” class that does not provide class members 
with a right to opt out of the class.  As explained in the Advisory Committee 
note to the 1966 amendment, Rule 23(b)(2) was adopted to enable the 
prosecution of civil rights actions and it does not extend to cases in which the 
appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to monetary 
damages.216  Thus, in the context of civil rights litigation seeking declaratory 
relief for violation of constitutional rights, Rule 23(b)(2) actions are 
particularly appropriate.  
The certification procedure is supplemented by techniques devised to 
preserve the rights of the individual members of the class, such as “broad 
notice of the suit and its processes, refusal to proceed until the original 
parties procure the representation of specified interests, recruitment efforts 
by special masters, and invitations to amici curiae.”217  Additionally, the law 
provides guideposts for the judge to evaluate whether the party applying for 
representative party status will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.  The court will assess whether such party can act in an informed 
manner, diligently, and vigorously, and whether there is a possibility of 
conflicting interests or a risk of collusion.218 
Upon certifying the class, the court appoints a class counsel, who acquires 
control of the proceedings.  The court must also evaluate the ability of 
counsel to represent the interests of the class in a balanced, appropriate 
fashion, as well as consider the resources that counsel will commit to 
representing the class.  To inform the certification decision, “the judge may 
conduct preliminary evidentiary hearings on the merits or the class issue, 
appoint special masters, request amicus briefs, or permit intervention in order 
to gather information.”219  In this regard, the clear statutory guidance 
furnished by Rule 23(g) is vital to the proceeding; even so, there is a very 
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real possibility that class lawyers will not adequately represent the interests 
of their clients.220 
Finally, one of the salient features of Rule 23 is the broad binding effect 
of a class judgment on the parties involved in the dispute.  Pursuant to 
subdivision (c)(3), the judgment rendered in class actions contemplated in 
subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall be 
final and binding on all class members.221  
As set forth above, the most highly developed and effective forms of 
structural reform processes are handled through voluntary settlements or 
consent decrees.  The unambiguous, thorough regulation of the various 
aspects of class actions and the class certification process under subdivision 
(b)(2) makes these negotiated solutions considerably easier to achieve.  
Sabel and Simon highlight that the focal point in the multilateral model of 
structural litigation is that “the court must identify the affected people, assess 
the representativeness of those who purport to speak for them, and 
sometimes assign weights to the competing interests asserted in the 
process.”222 
In Argentina, there is no federal code or statute that provides for general, 
comprehensive regulation of class, group or collective actions that may give 
rise to structural reform.  There are only laws containing specific provisions 
in areas like habeas corpus, consumer rights, or environmental law.  These 
are scattered rules that only address some specific facets of collective 
processes, for example by granting consumer or environmental associations 
or certain public authorities broad standing to sue and by establishing basic 
guidelines regarding the extended effects of res judicata.  
In Verbitsky, for instance, the action was maintained according to the 
procedure provided for in Law No. 23098 on habeas corpus.223  The habeas 
corpus action, also provided for in Article 43 of the Argentine Constitution, 
typically entails an expedited, simple, prompt relief proceeding directed to 
restoring a person’s freedom or to remedying an aggravation of detention 
conditions.  But as the proceeding is expedited in nature, it leaves no room 
for a class certification process, for broad participation of third parties or 
amici curiae, or for expanded debate and proffering of evidence.  The same 
holds true of an “amparo” proceeding224: they are both exceptional devices 
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but are only to be resorted to in cases of urgency, and in the event of patent 
violations of constitutional rights.  Thus, habeas corpus or amparo actions 
are not suitable for multilateral litigation requiring devices to accommodate 
the participation of various social sectors as well as rules for ample debate 
and evidence.225 
In Mendoza, the action was brought under the procedure regulated by the 
General Environment Act No. 25675.226  As noted earlier, this law does not 
offer exhaustive regulation of the collective process, but merely formulates a 
broad standing-to-sue standard, authorizes the judge to apply procedural 
rules more flexibly, and provides for extended effects of res judicata, subject 
to certain limitations.  The law contemplates no mechanism for certification 
of a class that might be affected by environmental damage and gives no 
guiding principles to assess the appropriate representation of the plaintiff.  
As to the effects of the judgment, it provides that it will be final and binding 
on third parties unrelated to the litigation, except where the case is lost on 
account of evidentiary shortfalls.  It should further be noted that the law 
contains no special provisions governing possible settlements.  
What these cases evince is that Public Law Litigation initiatives have 
been undertaken without any apposite procedural regulation.  The Supreme 
Court attempted to fill this void in the Halabi case,227 in which it pointed to 
the failure by Congress to regulate this vital aspect of collective claims and 
expressly acknowledged the viability of a collective claim covering 
homogeneous individual interests, provided certain requirements are met. 
The Supreme Court explicitly stated in its decision that this device needed 
regulation in a manner such that legal actions should have “characteristics 
and effects analogous to those under the law of the United States.”228 
However, this type of approach, whereby the courts purportedly seek to 
fill a statutory gap, is particularly ineffective.229  Consistent with its nature as 
a judgment, the Supreme Court’s decision limited itself to outlining some 
elementary procedural issues, but failed to make provision for a myriad of 
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aspects that are essential for a reasonable use of class actions and for the 
proper implementation of a multilateral model of structural reform.  
The absence of clear statutory regulation at the federal level is now 
causing many practical problems.  For example, this void is used as “an 
excuse for the filing of generic and vague complaints that curtail the exercise 
of one of the most significant constitutional safeguards, namely, none other 
than the right to a defense in court and to due process of law.”230  Issues of 
overlapping claims and jurisdiction likewise arise,231 which defendants often 
exploit to delay litigation.  
In any case, the most serious problem posed by the absence of 
comprehensive and appropriate statutory regulation is the lack of incentives 
to adopt a multilateral litigation model and to reach solutions in the form of a 
settlement.  This is an essential feature of the regulation scheme in the area 
of Public Law Litigation, as may clearly be inferred from the experience in 
the United States.  Therefore, it is important to highlight that the question 
does not revolve merely around filling a statutory gap, but rather around the 
absolute need to adopt the model for statutory regulation of class actions that 
best fits the dynamics of structural reform litigation.  
In this connection, it is worth pointing out that legislative initiatives 
regarding collective claims in Latin America do not follow the American 
class actions model, but Brazil’s collective claims model and the “The Ibero-
American Collective Actions Model Code.”  In Argentina, the few statutes in 
force in this regard, such as the Consumer Protection Act232 or the General 
Environment Act, as well as the majority of bills pending in Congress in this 
area,233 are essentially patterned on the Brazilian model.  
As regards Public Law Litigation specifically, the Brazilian model differs 
from the regulation of class actions under Rule 23 as follows:  
(i) it does not provide for a stage for class certification, as the 
focus is only on the expansion of standing to sue;  
(ii) individuals are in all cases given an opt-out right;  
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2015] PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION  497 
 
(iii) there are no objective standards laid down by law for the 
judge to pass on the adequacy of party representation or of 
class counsel;234 
(iv) the collective judgment, or the settlement reached,235 is 
binding on all group members, but it is “vulnerable.”236  The 
decision must not prejudice the individual rights of class 
members, which may be asserted by using a separate individual 
procedural avenue (secundum eventum litis), nor does it bar 
relitigation of the issues when the collective complaint has 
been dismissed for lack of evidence (secundum probationem).  
The reasons that have historically led Latin American countries to adopt a 
model having these differing features hinge on the idea that they have a poor 
notification system, unfit to make society aware of the existence of a 
collective claim, and that they lack a “culture” of collective processes as well 
as a legal bar or NGOs prepared to fund the prosecution of any such claim.237 
But these objections simply cannot stand today. The difficulties 
associated with notification that were exposed more than thirty years ago 
should now be deemed overcome. Most countries can rely on the deep 
penetration of the media, internet, and mobile devices, even among the 
neediest sectors of the population. Moreover, the record in Verbitsky and 
Mendoza shows that countries like Argentina have developed a strong 
culture of collective processes over the last decade, with a mushrooming of 
NGOs now engaged in this type of activity.  
It follows that in the current circumstances, those countries seeking to 
embrace the most successful models of Public Law Litigation should pass 
procedural legislation that would place the right incentives for negotiated 
reforms.  Specifically, the procedural rules that are to govern structural 
reform cases should satisfy at least the following minimum requirements:  
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(i) a process for class certification providing for the 
appointment of a sole representative;  
(ii) the possibility of certifying a mandatory class, without opt-
out rights;  
(iii) clear standards for the judge to evaluate, throughout the 
proceedings, if party representation and class counsel are 
adequate;  
(iv) the judgment and the settlement reached should be final 
and binding on all class members and definitively dispose of all 
issues raised, without the possibility, in ordinary 
circumstances, of instituting subsequent actions in connection 
therewith.  
These requirements, which have driven the successful cases of structural 
reform in the United States, are key to the establishment of a class 
representative equipped with strong bargaining power and capable of 
offering both parties the possibility of a definitive solution that is immune 
from subsequent challenge via collective or individual claims.  It is otherwise 
less probable that a multilateral model of structural reform can be 
implemented with a focus on negotiation and on disposition of the issues by 
means of settlements or consent decrees.  
2.  Agency Problems 
As stated above, structural reform cases tend to place too much power in 
the hands of class representatives.  Thus the system clears the way for them 
to abuse their position of control and strike collusive agreements to the 
detriment of the wronged group, of some segment of that group, or of 
government agencies.  These agency problems emerged as one of the reasons 
for strong prejudice in Latin American countries against the use of collective 
claims.  
A starting point to examine this issue lies in existing evidence that judges, 
when faced with a consent decree, generally act with “a great deal of 
timidity” and “are willing to let the parties, particularly the defendants, 
control the process and outcome of these lawsuits.”238  In these cases, it is a 
“controlling group”239 or “organizational leadership,”240 as it has come to be 
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known, that usually imposes its will and drives the litigation, rather than “the 
class members themselves.”241 
At the same time, this anomaly can be readily identified as the political 
front. Specialized authors have pointed out that the political branches of 
government often resort to litigation to shirk their executive or legislative 
responsibilities toward the citizens.  It has thus been criticized that in 
employing complex procedural devices, a court “allowed the use of its office 
to give political cover to a governor who should have taken responsibility for 
the decision on his own.”242 
Within the context of prison reform in the United States, correctional and 
law enforcement officers were usually collaborators in the litigation.  The 
remedies in these cases, “frequently designed at least in part by the 
defendants themselves, very much served what at least some of those 
defendants saw as their interests: increasing their budgets, controlling their 
inmate populations, and encouraging the professionalization of their 
workforces and the bureaucratization of their organizations.”243 
In the field of educational reform, many authors have underscored the 
state of risk and disadvantage experienced by “clients whose educational 
interests may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their 
attorneys.”244  Here, one can often see class counsel “making decisions, 
setting priorities, and undertaking responsibilities that should be determined 
by their clients and shaped by the community.”245 
This turns the spotlight on the attorneys who act as representatives not 
only of their direct clients (whether individuals or organizations) but also of 
the class as a whole. In these scenarios, attorneys must act as “spokesmen for 
large groupings toward which they had duties and responsibilities different 
from those of the ordinary lawyer-client relationship,”246 which normally 
worsens agency problems247 and prompts attorneys to “advance their vision 
of the public interest, often at the expense of some of their clients.”248 
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Several legal and institutional initiatives have been put forward to address 
these agency problems.  First among them has been the demand for greater 
involvement of the judge in all phases of the lawsuit, especially in narrowing 
the issues249 and subject to the duty to exercise close control over the content 
of any settlements agreed upon.  
A second point of concern involves potential conflicts of interest, which 
make a strong case for expanding the participation of persons that might be 
affected by the decision.  As Appel explains, although broad intervention 
may add time to the proceeding, “intervenors must intervene because the 
parties representing their interests are inadequate” and “attorneys for their 
interest are inept, inexperienced, overworked, underpaid, or all four.”250  
Thus, there should be rules specifically devised to govern the activity of class 
actions counsel, compelling them, for example, to make full “disclosure of 
potential conflicts between class and attorney, or among class members 
themselves.”251 
Third, legislation must provide for mechanisms that can best ensure direct 
participation by the actual parties “rather than exclusive reliance on class 
counsel.”252  This should be balanced against the great deal of bargaining 
power that class representatives must exercise in multilateral models.  Then, 
a proper mechanism to accommodate both interests at stake would be to 
regulate a phase in the court proceeding in which interested parties have the 
chance to make “suggestions about the settlement or object to its provisions, 
without enjoying the right to litigate the underlying liability of the 
defendant.”253  In other words, interested parties should be afforded a formal 
hearing to suggest that contents or changes be introduced before the decree 
can be approved or that, in certain cases, consent decrees be disapproved.254 
In Argentina, class actions are not specifically and thoroughly regulated, 
which translates, in turn, into the non-existence of any of these special 
safeguards against possible conflicts of interest between counsel and some of 
the class members or against collusion with the representatives of the 
opposite party.  Naturally, there are general provisions governing the practice 
of law that hold attorneys criminally liable where they assume the defense of 
adverse parties simultaneously or successively or deliberately prejudice their 
client’s case.255  However, none of these provisions are specific enough to 
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spell out the disclosures that counsel should make within the framework of a 
class action lawsuit.  There are no objective provisions to which the judges 
or class members can look for guidance in determining who is qualified to 
serve as class counsel.  
Further, there is no law that formally contemplates the procedural devices 
needed to ensure third-party intervention and a fairness hearing involving all 
those potentially damaged.  However, the proceedings in Verbitsky and 
Mendoza have in fact included the holding of public hearings and the 
establishment of collective bodies charged with opening dialogue pathways 
and channeling citizen participation in monitoring the execution of the plan.  
These public hearings notwithstanding, the standard used to grant the right to 
formally intervene in the lawsuit, whether as a party proper or as a third party 
entitled to participate and have its own say in the discussion, has at times 
been too restrictive.  
In Verbitsky, the Supreme Court issued, as stated earlier, a judgment for 
relief and mandatorily set the core objectives of the reform plan, without 
remanding the case to the provincial courts or without any active 
involvement on the part of the respective governor.  It has also been 
mentioned that the “Dialogue Table” did not manage to stay operative over 
the course of time.  As for Mendoza, a flexible approach was used to 
determine the persons who would serve as representatives for the the 
plaintiff’s side and those who would stand on the defendants’ side.256  
However, a rather restrictive approach was later favored in order to dismiss 
other filings or refuse to hear other opinions that could have contributed 
substantially to the case.257 
Regarding the content and openness of the hearings at the Supreme Court, 
it should be kept in mind that they were meant to pivot strictly on “certain 
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core topics”258 and held for informational purposes only.  In the words of the 
Supreme Court, hearings usually served the objective of reporting on “the 
degree of progress in complying with the orders made”259 but were not used 
for revising the adequacy of such orders.  
It is clear that the scope of these hearings should be established by law.  
Not only to guarantee participation for informational purposes, but also to 
check on class counsels and allow for robust citizen monitoring of the 
content of consent decrees. Countries like Argentina should make 
appropriate provision for the possibility of maintaining actions in which any 
settlements reached are mandatorily binding on all class members; likewise, 
provision ought to be made for the overall involvement of the MPF in all 
matters in which a settlement or consent decree may be agreed upon.260 
In sum, both settlements and consent decrees offer innumerable benefits 
as instruments for the resolution of collective disputes.  But the very nature 
of collective rights calls for an analysis of the special conditions that must be 
present for a fair settlement to be deemed feasible and mutually beneficial 
for the parties involved.  
3. Flexibility 
Administrative activities are dynamic and rest on pragmatic decisions 
calculated to suit the needs of a particular case; decisions must thus be 
flexible enough to continuously adapt to a changing reality. Where 
administrative activities are undertaken by judicial bodies, whose discourse 
is naturally rights-oriented, the result can take the form of inadequacies and 
conflicts that lead to inefficient management of social conflict and the 
emasculation of the rights involved.  
In the case of school desegregation, we have seen that top-down reform 
plans like “busing” yielded an unwanted result.  The fact that, in many states, 
families moved to the suburbs to flee a forced integration “helped produce 
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largely white suburbs ringing largely minority inner cities.”261  The origin of 
this unwanted effect of resegregation can be traced to the somewhat rigid 
approach originally employed to enforce Brown. Paradoxically, the white 
flight and geographic resegregation “[were] fully consistent with Brown, or 
perhaps more correctly, with what Brown had become.”262 
This is why in those instances in which judicial intervention has been 
particularly rigid, the impact of the reform has been weaker and 
counterproductive effects have multiplied.  Additionally, the crystallization 
of certain standards adopted in a court decision or consent decree may have a 
discouraging effect, and hinder the formulation of more ambitious objectives 
beyond those set by the judges themselves.  For example, it has been claimed 
that “the very rigidity of the Jose P. decree and the process it required made 
it more difficult for new mayors, new chancellors, or new boards of 
education to improve the entire system.”263 
These paradoxes are also very frequent in the environmental field.  Here, 
it is not at all uncommon for a particular group to “obtain a court order 
forcing a local government to spend its scarce capital funds to meet a clean 
water act requirement that has limited environmental benefit but that causes 
the local government to delay other capital improvements that have greater 
environmental benefits.”264 
Logically enough, U.S. courts have acknowledged that structural reform 
decisions or consent decrees may be amended, revised, or mitigated both in 
the event of an “unforeseen” significant change in circumstances and when 
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed 
circumstances.265  But this avenue for revision is difficult to use, so it must 
be thoroughly regulated.  
With regards to the situation in Latin America, it has been warned that 
these paradoxical consequences can be even more acute than in other 
regions.  To the extent that inequality is more pronounced, certain groups 
find it more difficult to gain access to the judicial system, and thus, judicial 
decisions in the area of social rights are liable to have an overall adverse 
effect on the poorer segments of society in terms of distribution.266 
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In Argentina, despite the short track record in this field, it is clear that 
allowance has been made for the premise of flexibility.  In the Verbitsky 
case, the establishment of a “Dialogue Table” by the Supreme Court was 
aimed at affording the system the required flexibility and capacity for 
ongoing adaptation of the objectives and orders issuing from the Judiciary.  
At the same time, a negative aspect was that the original decision was 
prepared without remanding it to the provincial courts and with scant 
involvement of the Province of Buenos Aires.  This entails high chances of 
inadequacies in the quest for adjustment to the changing reality of a district 
riddled with economic difficulties.  It also may explain the inefficiency that 
the “Dialogue Table” has had in actual practice.  
As for Mendoza, it is worth noting that both the proceeding leading to the 
issuance of the judgment and the subsequent enforcement proceedings were 
handled as participatory channels, with a powerful response from the public 
and a large number of hearings.  Although the Supreme Court went perhaps 
too far in restricting the formal participation of some relevant third parties 
and that the public hearings before it were marked by excessive rigidity, it 
should be conceded that, at least from a formal standpoint mechanisms were 
properly introduced for judicial orders to become more flexible and to be 
gradually adapted.  It should also be mentioned that the enforcement court 
held numerous hearings in order to exchange ideas with ACUMAR, the 
municipal authorities, public utilities, and other players involved.267  In 
addition, as stated by the Supreme Court itself, the reform plan consists of “a 
program setting out objectives and results, the contents and timelines for 
which have been accurately defined,”268 but includes no detailed 
specification of the technical means to be employed, which choice has been 
left to the discretion of the enforcement authorities.  It is thus clear that the 
reform plan was conceived with adequate flexibility.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
From a purely practical standpoint, the comparative analysis of Public 
Law Litigation experiences in the United States and Argentina reveals 
disparate results.  It becomes clear that the achievement of sustained long-
term effectiveness and impact, depends crucially on certain political 
conditions and technical requirements. 
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With respect to the political conditions, the American experience suggests 
that structural remedies are effective when the Judiciary acts with the support 
of the political branches and in an institutional framework in which its 
authority is undisputed.  To this point, the Argentine experience confirms 
this debated claim.  The Supreme Court of Argentina has acted prudently, 
making a restrictive use of an instrument that is still presented to society as 
one to resort to in exceptional circumstances.  It has thus been sensible to 
address such issues as those involving the environment or prison conditions, 
seeking to act in line with, rather than run counter to, the agenda of the other 
branches of the federal government and of majority public opinion.  
However, the Supreme Court of Argentina is still inherently weak within the 
political system, so when the political momentum waned, the cases either 
came to a standstill or experienced serious retrogression.  
It can therefore be gleaned from these observations that resorting to 
Public Law Litigation and structural reform as a legitimization strategy has 
not been helpful enough for the Judiciary to claim for itself the authority 
needed to prevail over the other branches of government.  This lack of 
authority proves to be a major obstacle to the successful use of both a 
unilateral or a multilateral model of structural reform, because in the latter 
case, the authority of the judge has an implicitly vital role to play.  The 
deadlock and corruption scandals in which the Argentine cases are now 
caught, the lack of transparent management, and the absence of strongly 
convincing results in the collective processes reviewed above can all actively 
work against the Judiciary’s credibility.  It follows that the political 
conditions required for the effective employment of structural remedies do 
not seem to be currently in place in Argentina, and this may explain the low 
impact of the intended reform programs.  
As for the technical side of the model, the comparative method shows that 
Argentina, as well as many other Latin American countries, still suffers from 
an objective deficit in its legislation.  The lack of detailed statutory 
regulation of a class action or collective claims system, explicitly designed to 
accommodate Public Law Litigation, prevents judges and parties alike from 
building an active front equipped with sufficient bargaining power.  In 
Argentina, the Supreme Court noticed this problem and attempted to solve it 
with its decision in Halabi, holding informative hearings or with the creation 
of ad hoc devices such as the “Dialogue Table” in Verbitsky.  But these 
judicial initiatives to close the statutory gap have been fruitless, so it comes 
as no surprise that the implementation of a multilateral model of structural 
reform has so far proved impossible.  Thus, the Argentine case confirms the 
necessity of legislating thoroughly this area of procedural law, designing a 
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special class action framework following the path of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as amended in 1966, and addressing the many agency 
problems that regularly arise in this context.  
In short, the theoretical model developed in this Article, reveals that 
countries like Argentina still face objective barriers in both the political and 
the technical spheres that account for the low impact that the use of structural 
remedies has had to this day.  Aware of these deficiencies, and confronted 
with dramatic situations such as those underlying the Verbitsky and Mendoza 
cases, the Argentine Supreme Court stepped boldly onto the scene.  It 
probably hoped that its decided action in these areas might earn for itself the 
authority it then lacked, and that it might fill the void of technical 
instruments with case-by-case solutions.  Evidence shows, however, that it 
does not seem possible to use shortcuts and jump to a quick and effective 
application of sophisticated multilateral models of structural remedies 
without first laying solid foundations through the adoption of other 
legitimization strategies. 
Without the proper institutional framework, the Judiciary cannot rely on 
structural reform as a starting point for a legitimization strategy; as that is, at 
best, a final destination.  Much to the contrary, such a strategy may result in 
the loss of its main symbolic capital, as structural reform cases bring judges 
fully into the political arena and drives them away from the prestigious, 
traditional paradigm of neutral players. 
Finally, the Argentine experience confirms once again that in many cases 
judicialization leads to demobilization and paradoxical results.  This may 
cause major delays in reforms and harm the victim groups. It is thus 
advisable for legal activists and stakeholders to channel their resources into 
ensuring the fulfillment of political conditions and technical requirements 
that will ultimately enable the Judiciary to employ more effective forms of 
intervention. 
